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Issue I

COURT REPORTS

ton's Illinois facilities. On most days, Bunch spent about twenty minutes aboard the SirJoseph.
Although the cleaning barge was originally built for navigation,
Canton generally kept it secured in position. Strong currents would
shift the position of barge slightly. During Bunch's tenure, Canton
moved the cleaning barge only once from the Illinois side of the river
to the Missouri side. The cleaning barge did not have propellers and
did not move by itself. On April 20, 2001, as Bunch traveled from the
cleaning barge to the Illinois facilities aboard the Sir Joseph, Bunch
stopped the tug to inspect other barges. After inspecting the other
barges, Bunch fell climbing back aboard the Sir Joseph and sustained
injuries.
Bunch sued Canton and the Sir Joseph under the Jones Act
("Act"), section 33 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920, 46 U.S.C. app.
§ 688. The United States Supreme Court established a two-part test for
determining seaman status under the Act in Chandris,Inc. v. Latsis- (1)
the "employee's duties must contribute to the function of the vessel or
to the accomplishment of its mission," and (2) the employee "must
have a connection to a vessel in navigation .

.

. that is substantial in

terms of both its duration and its nature." Applying this test, the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri granted
summary judgment to Canton, concluding Bunch was not a "seaman"
covered by the Jones Act because Bunch "simply did not have a substantial connection to a vessel in navigation."
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit needed only to consider whether the cleaning barge, upon which
Bunch spent the majority of his work time, qualified as a "vessel in
navigation." The court applied the recent United States Supreme
Court decision in Stewart v. Dutra Construction Co., wherein the Supreme Court clarified the definition of "vessel" under the Act. Based
on Stewart, the court focused on Canton's use of the cleaning barge,
questioning whether the cleaning barge could operate "as a means of
transportation on water." The court concluded the cleaning barge was
a "vessel in navigation" because Canton had not permanently moored
or anchored the cleaning barge to the river bed, and Canton had
moved the barge from its mooring to travel across the river during the
time Bunch worked for Canton. The fact that currents would move the
barge also demonstrated the mooring was not permanent. Lastly,
there was no evidence showing that Canton had taken the barge out of
service or rendered the barge incapable of maritime transportation.
The court remanded the case to the district court for proceedings consistent with its decision.
Kevin Kennedy
In re Operation of the Mo. River Sys. Litig., 418 F.3d 915; 421 F.3d 618
(8th Cir. 2005) (multiple states and conservation organizations initi-

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 9

ated litigation seeking declaration that federal management of the
Missouri River violated state and environmental standards, and sought
injunctive relief requiring that the agencies comply with the standards).
Background
The Missouri River begins in Montana, runs through North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Iowa, Kansas, and Missouri, then flows
into the Mississippi River. To try to control spring flooding of the
river, Congress enacted the Flood Control Act of 1944 ("FCA"), which
authorized the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps") to construct a
dam and reservoir system on the upper part of the river. Congress also
authorized the Corps to manage the main stem reservoir system by
using the reservoirs as a water source for irrigation projects, slowly releasing water from the reservoirs during the summer to facilitate downstream navigation, providing hydroelectric power, and generally providing a site for water recreation. In balancing these competing interests, the U.S. Supreme Court, in South Dakota v. Ubbelohde, held "the
Corps's primary concerns should be flood control and navigation."
The Corps published its general operational guidelines for the Missouri River reservoir system in a Master Manual, the most recent version being the 2004 Master Manual. The Corps' overall operation of
the river system included capturing water upstream using dams and
reservoirs, thereby eliminating flooding, then slowly releasing water
from the reservoirs during the summer and fall to enable downstream
navigation.
In re Operation of the Mo. River Sys. Litig., 421 F.3d 618 (8th Cir.
2005) (affirming summary judgment for the Corps and U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service because (1) the Master Manual was not invalid because
the Corps properly considered downstream navigation; (2) the Corps
could comply with the ESA and still meet its statutory duty under the
FCA, because the Corps had discretion in balancing navigation with
the other interests; (3) the FWS considered the best scientific data with
respect to the summer low flow and met the required rational connection between the decision and the facts; (4) the FWS and Corps demonstrated a proper rational connection between the scientific evidence
and the decision to use habitat restoration for the flow requirements
mandated by the 2000 Opinion; and (5) the information presented by
the Corps for the preferred alternative was sufficient.)
In addition to balancing competing goals of the river system, the
Corps must operate in accordance with the Endangered Species Act
("ESA"). If the Corps' operation of the river threatens the existence of
a species protected under the ESA, or hurts its critical habitat, the FWS
must analyze the degree of impact. The FWS issues a Biological Opin-

